DYNAMIC BARGAINING AND CDM LOW HANGING FRUITS WITH QUADRATIC EMISSIONS ABATEMENT COST

Akita J. A simple model of CDM low-hanging fruit. In: Sawa T (ed) International frameworks and technological strategies to prevent climate change. Springer, Tokyo, pp.66-96, 2003

Bréchet T, Germain M, van Steenberghe V. The clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol and the ‘low-hanging fruits’ issue. CORE Discussion Paper, 2004/81, CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 2004.

Germain, M., Magnus, A., & van Steenberghe, V. How to design and use the clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol A developing country perspective. Environmental and Resource Economics, 38(1), 13-30. DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9066- 3, 2007.

Grout P A. ‘Investment and wages in the absence of binding contracts: a Nash bargaining approach’, Econometrica 52. pp 449-60, 1984.

Imai, H, H. Niizawa, and J. Akita “Effects of Alternative CDM baseline Schemes under an Imperfectly Competitive Market Structure” in Dinar, A. et. al. eds. Game Theory and Policymaking in Natural Resources and the Environment, Routledge,, pp 307-334, 2008.

Nagashima, M., R.B. Dellink, E.C. van Ierland and H.-P. Weikard Stability of international climate coalitions - a comparison of transfer schemes. Ecological Economics 68,, pp 1476-1487, 2009.

Narain, U., & van’t Veld, K. The Clean Development Mechanism’s Low-hanging Fruit Problem: When Might it Arise, and How Might it be Solved Environmental and Resource Economics, 40(3), pp 445-465, 2008. DOI: 10.1007/s10640-007-9164-x

Rose A, Bulte E, Folmer H. Long-run implications for developing countries of joint implementation of greenhouse gas mitigation. Environmental and Resource Economics 14, pp 19–31, 1999.

Tadenuma, K. “International Negotiation for the mitigation of Global warming-A Game Theoretical Approach” Economics Studies, 55, pp 26-37 (in Japanese), 2004. SGEM2012 - DOI: 10.5593/sgem2012 www.sgem.org

Akita J. A simple model of CDM low-hanging fruit. In: Sawa T (ed) International frameworks and technological strategies to prevent climate change. Springer, Tokyo, pp.66-96, 2003

Bréchet T, Germain M, van Steenberghe V. The clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol and the ‘low-hanging fruits’ issue. CORE Discussion Paper, 2004/81, CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 2004.

Germain, M., Magnus, A., & van Steenberghe, V. How to design and use the clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol A developing country perspective. Environmental and Resource Economics, 38(1), 13-30. DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9066- 3, 2007.

Grout P A. ‘Investment and wages in the absence of binding contracts: a Nash bargaining approach’, Econometrica 52. pp 449-60, 1984.

Imai, H, H. Niizawa, and J. Akita “Effects of Alternative CDM baseline Schemes under an Imperfectly Competitive Market Structure” in Dinar, A. et. al. eds. Game Theory and Policymaking in Natural Resources and the Environment, Routledge,, pp 307-334, 2008.

Nagashima, M., R.B. Dellink, E.C. van Ierland and H.-P. Weikard Stability of international climate coalitions - a comparison of transfer schemes. Ecological Economics 68,, pp 1476-1487, 2009.

Narain, U., & van’t Veld, K. The Clean Development Mechanism’s Low-hanging Fruit Problem: When Might it Arise, and How Might it be Solved Environmental and Resource Economics, 40(3), pp 445-465, 2008. DOI: 10.1007/s10640-007-9164-x

Rose A, Bulte E, Folmer H. Long-run implications for developing countries of joint implementation of greenhouse gas mitigation. Environmental and Resource Economics 14, pp 19–31, 1999.

Tadenuma, K. “International Negotiation for the mitigation of Global warming-A Game Theoretical Approach” Economics Studies, 55, pp 26-37 (in Japanese), 2004. SGEM2012 - DOI: 10.5593/sgem2012 www.sgem.org